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VOL. 7, ISSUE 2 (2025)
Corporate governance mechanisms and firm value: Evidence from emerging market
Authors
Dr. Suman
Abstract
This study examines the influence of corporate
governance mechanisms on firm value within the context of emerging markets,
where institutional frameworks, regulatory environments, and ownership
structures differ substantially from those in developed economies. Drawing on
agency theory and resource dependence perspectives, the research investigates
how board characteristics, ownership concentration, audit quality, and
shareholder protection practices contribute to enhancing or diminishing firm
value. Using a panel dataset of publicly listed firms across selected emerging
economies from 2010 to 2023, the study employs robust econometric
techniques—including fixed-effects models and generalised method of moments—to
address endogeneity and heterogeneity concerns. The findings reveal that strong
governance mechanisms, particularly board independence and higher audit
quality, are positively associated with firm value. The effect of ownership
concentration is nonlinear, suggesting that while moderate concentration enhances
monitoring efficiency, excessively concentrated ownership may lead to
entrenchment and reduced value creation. The study also highlights the
moderating role of institutional quality, demonstrating that governance
mechanisms tend to be more effective in countries with stronger legal and
regulatory frameworks. These results offer meaningful implications for
policymakers, investors, and corporate managers seeking to strengthen
governance structures and improve market performance. Overall, the study contributes
to the growing literature by providing comprehensive, cross-country evidence on
the governance–value nexus in emerging markets.
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Pages:65-71
How to cite this article:
Dr. Suman "Corporate governance mechanisms and firm value: Evidence from emerging market". International Journal of Commerce and Economics, Vol 7, Issue 2, 2025, Pages 65-71
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